Summary: Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be i.i.d. random variables with a known continuous distribution function. Robbins' problem is to find a sequential stopping rule without recall which minimizes the expected rank of the selected observation. An upper bound (obtained by memoryless threshold rules) and a procedure to obtain lower bounds of the value are known, but the essence of the problem is still unsolved. The difficulty is that the optimal strategy depends for all n > 2 in an intractable way on the whole history of preceding observations. The goal of this article is to understand better the structure of both optimal memoryless threshold rules and the (overall) optimal rule. We prove that the optimal rule is a "stepwise" monotone increasing threshold-function rule and then study its property of, what we call, full history-dependence. For each n , we describe a tractable statistic of preceding observations which is sufficient for optimal decisions of decision makers with half-prophetical abilities who can do generally better than we. It is shown that their advice can always be used to improve strictly on memoryless rules, and we determine such an improved rule for all n . The essence of Robbins' problem would be to prove or disprove the existence of asymptotically (as n → ∞) relevant improvements.
consider depend only on the ranks of the X i , we may and do assume, w.l.o.g., that F is uniform on [0, 1] . The relative rank of observation X k is defined as
where I(A) denotes the indicator of the event A. Note that we define the smaller observations to be the better ones, which proves here to be more convenient. Let
denote the absolute rank of X k , and let T denote the set of all stopping rules, 2, . . . , n}, (1.3) where F k denotes the σ -field generated by X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k . R * k is not F k -measurable, and so we replace it by its conditional expectation given F k , R k = E(R * k |F k ) = r k + (n − k)X k (see also Assaf & Samuel-Cahn (A&S-C, 1992) ). Robbins' problem is then to find
( 1 .4) and the stopping rule τ which attains this value. This is the full-information version of the problem studied by Chow et al. (1964) .
Motivation.
The motivation to study Robbins' problem goes beyond the ambition to solve the 4th secretary problem (see Bruss and Ferguson (B&F),1993 ). Once we think about it, we see that this problem stands indeed for a whole class of problems, about which little is known. The central question is what to do if the optimal rule is seemingly dependent on the whole history (in a sense which we will make precise) and if we do not have an idea about the value. Replacing at each stage the history by some adequately looking summary of the available information, on which we would base the decisions, is of little help, because if we cannot assess the error, how can we evaluate the trial? In
Robbins' problem, it turns out, that we have reasonable bounds to the value, and with a lower bound of 1.908 and an upper bound of 2.3232 , we have indeed little to worry about.
But what to do if the bounds are not close at all? -The problem would stay the same, and any improvement would be desirable.
Organization of the Paper. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2
we review memoryless threshold rules, prove the uniqueness of the optimal rule in this class and briefly discuss computational methods. Section 3, which prepares the study of the overall optimal rule, introduces the notion of a half-prophet. This is a decision maker who turns into a prophet provided he decides not to choose the present observation and to go on. Thus a half-prophet has more power than we have, and it will be shown that he needs all preceding information to realize the optimal value. Section 4 contains the main results of the paper. We show in Lemma 4.1 that the overall optimal rule is a "stepwise" monotone threshold function rule which contrasts the lack of monotonicity with respect to preceding observations. We then discuss the notion of full history-dependence of a stopping rule and show that the overall optimal rule for Robbins' problem has this property. In
Section 5 we describe a rule which strictly improves on the optimal memoryless rule for finite n . §2. Memoryless Threshold Strategies.
By a threshold strategy or rule we mean a stopping rule, where the decision whether or not to select the observation X k (i.e. stop at k ) depends only on whether or not X k is smaller (respectively larger, depending on the problem) than some real (threshold) value p k . The p k 's are often thought of as being constants (see also Kennedy & Kertz (1990) ).
We must classify here threshold rules more precisely and prefer to call these memoryless (in short m 0 -) threshold rules to distinguish them from those threshold rules where each p k may itself be a function of some or all preceding observations. Thus a m 0 -threshold rule is defined by
where p is a pre-determined sequence (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) with 0 ≤ p k ≤ 1 , k = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and p n = 1 . In the case of Robbins' problem we know (see also A&S-C, (1992) ) that if we use m 0 -threshold rules we can confine our interest to the class of monotone rules N (p), with p satisfying
The expected rank obtained by the N (p)-rule is given by formula (2.1) of B&F (1993).
The optimal p k 's , denoted by p the optimal p * k 's can be obtained from by solving the corresponding system of partial derivatives equations. We have Lemma 2.1: The system of partial differential equations
has, for all n ≥ 2 , a unique solution
) is a continuous function of the p k 's, it must take its minimum
n) denote this minimum value and let
be a sequence of m 0 -thresholds which achieves it. Note that we do not imply so far uniqueness of these thresholds. Clearly
because, for n > 1 , no sequential rule selects rank 1 with probability one.
We first show that p * 1 (n) must be greater than 0 for all n . This is intuitively clear, since we feel it cannot be optimal to refuse almost surely any first observation. Formally:
The statement is true for n = 1, since p * 1 (1) = 1 . Suppose now that p * 1 (n + 1) = 0 for some n ≥ 1 . Then the observation X 1 will be almost surely refused, so that memoryless optimal play on the X 2 , ..., X n+1 yields an expected total loss 
(2.7)
Clearly, the conditional probability term in (2.7) is non-increasing in p 1 on [0, 1] so that using (2.6) in (2.7) implies
Note that the last RHS of (2.8) can be made smaller than e n+1 (0) by choosing for p 1 any value such that 1 < 1 + np 1 /2 < e n+1 (0) or equivalently 0 < p 1 < 2(e n+1 (0) − 1)/n . This is possible as e n+1 (0) ≥ W m 0 > 1 for all n > 1 . Thus the choice p * 1 (n + 1) = 0 would be suboptimal for any n ≥ 1 , i.e. p * 1 (n + 1) > 0 for all n ≥ 1.
Secondly, since p * n (n) ≡ 1 , it is easy to see that we must have p * n−1 (n) < 1. Indeed, if we used the threshold value p n−1 = 1 , then we would select min{X n−1 , X n } with probability 1/2 . Any threshold value p n−1 with 0 < p n−1 < 1 however would do this with a higher probability and therefore yield a smaller rank, because this probability Since it has at least one, it must have a unique solution, which must be, accordingly, the minimum.
Remark 2.2. It is tempting to maximize q n−1 in (2.9) with respect to p n−1 , i.e. to choose p n−1 = 1/2 with q n−1 (1/2) = 3/4 , but this does not give the optimal threshold p * n−1 (n) (see for instance Table 1 ), because this simple probability argument neglects relative ranks and the fact that, given X n−2 has been passed over, X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n−2 are no longer i.i.d U[0,1] random variables. We shall see however later that p * n−1 (n) → 1/2 as n → ∞.
Computational aspects. Due to the mentioned multiquadratic property, the computation of the p * k 's is numerically (componentwise iteration) still tractable for larger n . Table 1a Table 1b Expected loss for the m 0 -rules
The following lemma shows that "most" of the p * j (n)'s tend to 0 as n → ∞. This will prove to be an essential tool in Section 5.
Lemma 2.3: Let
optimal thresholds for Robbins' problem with n observations. Further let α be a constant with 0 < α < 1 and α n = [αn], where [x] denotes the floor of x. Then, as n → ∞,
Proof: Suppose the contrary, i.e. there exists > 0 such that for all n and some
-optimal this would then imply that the observation X k = , say, must be accepted.
However, we shall see that we can construct another m 0 -rule yielding a strictly smaller expected loss. We first note that,
where r k ( ) denotes the relative rank of X k for X k = . Let δ be fixed but arbitrarily chosen with 0 < δ < , and let τ δ be the stopping time defined by
Conditioning on the outcome of X τ δ we obtain
where we used for τ δ = n the worst-case bound n as an upper bound for R n ≤ n .
As n → ∞, the first factor of the first term in the last line of (2.13) clearly tends to 1. The second summand in this line tends to 0 since
quickly than some (1 − α)n . Therefore, the RHS of (2.13) is close to
follows in particular that, for all n sufficiently large,
This means that, for all n sufficiently large, the rule τ δ defined by (2.11) yields a smaller expected loss than accepting some X k ≥ . However, this contradicts the hypothesis of p * k (n) > for all n , and thus proves the lemma. Now let V (n) denote the overall optimal value of Robbins' problem for n variables.
(2.14)
We know (see B&F (1993) ) that V m 0 = 2.326.... and that V > 1.908 , where the latter lower bound was obtained by computing the optimal strategy for a truncated modification of the expected loss. We could also show that this procedure would converge to the correct limiting value V , but the computation times increase exponentially. The optimal strategy is very "sensitive" to the past, and no statistic is known, which summarizes enough of the information of the past to allow for a -optimal strategy while still being sufficiently tractable. We will introduce the notion of full history dependence to describe the mentioned sensitivity.
Apart from the above bounds we know little about V . We even do not know yet whether V > 2 , although one may, in principle, be able to settle this question numerically by the truncation method proposed in B&F (1993). Gnedin (1995, INFORM Conference on Applied Probability) reported that the strict inequality, V < V m 0 , can be obtained by an adequate embedding of the n = ∞ case into a Poisson process. We focus on finite n .
The V (n) are only known for n up to 5 , and computation times are prohibitive to try to do much better. This raises the question how to find tractable improvements on optimal threshold strategies, with which we deal in Section 5 and where half-prophets prove their usefulness again. §3. Half-prophets.
The motivation to introduce the notion of a half-prophet (h-prophet) is to overcome one side of the deadlock resulting from the apparent history dependence, namely the future side. An h-prophet, called in at time k say, can (as we can) see the observations X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k and nothing else. However, given that he decides not to select X k and to go on, then he foresees at time k + 1 the whole future X k+1 , X k+2 , . . . , X n (whereas we see of course only X k+1 ). The value of the game for an h-prophet depends, apart from n clearly also on k , and as we shall see, on the whole past X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k . We have to define more precisely:
Definition 3.1: An h(k )-prophet for a (discrete) sequential decision problem is a decision maker who is able to foresee the complete future if and only if he decides to enter stage k + 1.
An h-prophet is a decision maker, which can be elected to be an h(k )-prophet for exactly one k ≥ 1.
Note that an h-prophet in Robbins' problem faces a much simpler decision problem. He must only decide whether to select the present observation, or alternatively, to wait for the best later on. This "binary" feature implies that his value at time k , denoted by h(k, n), say, can be computed in a straightforward manner.
Lemma 3.2:
The value of an h(k )-prophet in Robbins' problem with n observations
Proof: We first note that if the h(k )-prophet selects X k then his expected loss
By independence of X j with j > k of the past, the second term simplifies to (n − k) X k so that
Suppose now that the h(k )-prophet refuses X k . Then he enters time k + 1 and optimal behavior forces him to select ι(k) := inf k<j≤n {X j } . The expected absolute rank of ι(k) by R ι(k) we obtain by conditioning on the value of ι(k) and by using its independence of can be written as
where
Interchanging the order of integration and summation and then adjusting the boundaries of integration according to the indicators yields by straightforward calculation
By the optimality principle, 5) and thus the statement of the Lemma is proved.
Remark 3.3:
The most powerful h-prophet -apart from the h(0)-prophet, who is equivalent to a prophet -is, by definition, the h(1)-prophet. He can simply ignore the decision problem any later h-prophet will face. Since his probability to select rank 1 tends to one as n → ∞ one feels that he is "asymptotically" as good as a prophet, and that indeed the same should be true for any h(k )-prophet for fixed k . This is true for the expected rank, but a worst case analysis shows, that all h-prophets are distinctly inferior to a prophet in the sense that sup x inf τ E(R τ |X 1 = x) > 1 . To see this, note that according to (3.2), (3.4) and (3.5)
say. Since (n − 1)x is increasing and (1 − x) n−1 decreasing on [0, 1] , and both intersect there, c n must be the unique solution of (n − 1)x = (1 − x) n−1 . Putting x = ξ/(n − 1) in (3.6) yields the limiting equation ξ = e −ξ with solution ξ = lim n→∞ c n = .5671 · · ·. Thus,
whereas a prophet can always achieve the value 1. §4. Properties of the optimal rule.
We turn now to the main results of this paper. The first is Lemma (4.1) which shows a monotonic feature which contrasts many non-monotonic features of Robbins' Problem.
This will then be used to show that the optimal rule depends in a certain sense on the full history of the process.
Stepwise Monotonicity of the Optimal Threshold Functions. We denote
by τ * = τ * (n) the (overall) optimal rule for Robbins' problem. An observation X k , which can be selected (respectively, must be refused) under the rule τ * (n)) will be called shortly acceptable, (respectively, unacceptable).
Lemma 4.1: τ * = τ * (n) is a stepwise monotone increasing threshold function rule for all n , i.e. it is of the form
where the functions p k (...) satisfy
and
Proof: (i) We show first, that τ * (n) is of the described form. For this we have to
show that, at any stage k , the following is true: Whenever it is optimal to stop at X k it would be optimal to stop for any X k ≤ X k , and whenever it is optimal to refuse X k it is optimal to refuse any
To see this let L k (x) be defined as in (3.2) with X k being replaced by x. Thus
describes our expected loss by accepting x at stage k . Clearly, L k (x) is strictly increasing in x for all 1 ≤ k < n.
On the other hand, the expected loss by refusing x at stage k and continuing optimally thereafter equals
where it is understood that n is arbitrarily chosen but fixed, and 1 ≤ k < n.
Let τ * x now be that rule which achieves L * k (x) given in (4.2). The latter can then be written in the form
Further, letL k (x, y) be that modification of (4.3) which replaces x (only) by y without
is then the conditional expected loss, given X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k−1 , X k = y , of the value obtained by the suboptimal continuation τ * x (which is optimal for x = y ). Since P (X τ * x ≥ y) is non-increasing in y , it follows thatL k (x, y) is non-increasing in y . Thus
(4.5)
On the other hand, suboptimality of τ * x for the history X 1 , X 2 , . . .
Combining inequalities (4.5) and (4.6) yields
An increasing L k (x) faces therefore a non-increasing L * k (x) as a function of x. (4.1) tells us further that for all k = 1, 2, . . . , n, L k (0) = 1 and L k (1) = n a.s., so that L * k (x) defined in (4.2) must lie in this range for any x ∈ [0, 1] . This proves for each stage k and 1 ≤ j ≤ k the existence of optimal thresholds p j (· · ·) such that any X j > p j (· · ·) must be refused whereas the first X k ≤ p k (· · ·) must be accepted.
(ii) The proof of the second part (optimal thresholds are monotone increasing) becomes shorter when we note that, by definition, the p k (...)'s need only be defined for those X 1 , X 2 . . . , X k−1 which are unacceptable. Therefore it suffices to show that if we replace an acceptable X k = x by an unacceptable X k > x then any X k+1 ≤ x is again acceptable.
replaced by an unacceptable X k then, by definition, X k > x. It follows then from (4.1) that for a fixed history
It suffices now to show that L * k (x) (see (4.2)) is non-decreasing in k , because then we have (4.8) i.e. X k+1 = x is then acceptable, so that p k+1 (...) ≥ p k (...) a.s. for any k and any history
is invariant a.s. with respect to any permutation of the history. Indeed, if the stopping rule τ * x achieves L * k (x) in (4.3) then τ * x achieves the same value for the history (
, because such a permutation only changes the order of summation of the first k terms on the RHS and since (X k+1 , · · · , X n ) is independent of the past. Now
say, since L * k+1 (x) has the above described invariance property, and since X k and
(4.10) because optimal behavior on the set {k < τ ≤ n} allows for stopping at stage k + 1, or to continue optimally otherwise. Thus, from (4.9) and (4.10),
(iii) Finally, the proof of p n−1 (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−2 ) < 1 a.s. follows immediately from p n (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−1 ) ≡ 1 and the argument we used in (2.9), because otherwise any memoryless threshold value p n−1 would do strictly better in expectation.
Full History Dependence of the Optimal Rule.
In this section we will see that the optimal rule has the property of being fully history dependent, that is at no time may one discard past information. At each stage k ≤ n − 1 , the exact values of all past observations may play a role in future optimal decisions. Clearly X k could not be accepted if X j for some 1 ≤ j < k would have been accepted so that the events {τ = k} and {τ > k} always depend on all preceding observations in this sense. However, this does not imply that all preceding observations are relevant for future optimal decisions. A fully history dependent rule allows for no fading of memory at all. Varying some X j (in certain cases even any X j ) by an arbitrary little amount may keep X j , . . . , X k−1 unacceptable but be decisive for X k to be acceptable or not.
To see that τ * is fully history-dependent, we show that for each stage s ≤ n − 1, τ * leads with positive probability to a situation where all preceding information X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X s−1 is needed to decide whether to stop and accept or, alternatively, to go on. Note that no information at all is needed at stage s = n , since p n (X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−1 ) ≡ 1 . Therefore we first look at s = n − 1 . The probability to reach stage n − 1 equals
where we used the definition of optimal threshold functions as given in Lemma 4.1 and the definition (convention) p 1 (·) := p 1 . According to Lemma 4.1 we have
Similarly
Suppose now that τ * I(τ * > n − 2) depends on all preceding information, i.e. that τ * is fully history-dependent on the set {τ * > n − 2} . At stage k , the decision to go on depends by the principle of optimality on the optimal (future) expected loss. This expected loss involves, with P (τ * > n− 2|τ * ≥ k) being a.s. strictly positive, by definition the expected loss on the set {τ * > n − 2} . In return, the latter depends according to our
Therefore, if all preceding information is needed at stage s = n − 1 , then all preceding information is needed at each stage 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 2 , and thus it suffices to show that τ * is fully history-dependent on {τ
To see the latter we recall first that, at stage s = n − 1 , we have the same capacity as a half-prophet. According to Lemma 3.2 we therefore accept X n−1 if
and accept X n otherwise. If we write r n−1 (x) for the rank of X n−1 given X n−1 = x, then the decision criterion becomes (4.13) where the RHS does not depend on x. We shall now distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: Suppose first that there exists x * , say, such that in (4.13) equality holds for both sides. Then, by definition, X n−1 = x * is acceptable. But since all X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−2 are a.s. different, their nearest neighbor distance , say, is a.s. positive.
Now move an arbitrarily chosen X j on the RHS to X j + /2 , say. This leaves by construction the relative ranks of X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−2 unchanged and the chosen j th observation stays unacceptable (becomes less desirable) by Lemma 4.1. Now
clearly stay unacceptable because they precede X j chronologically. On the other hand X j+1 , X j+2 , · · · , X n−2 are unacceptable as well, because they were unacceptable before the change and face with the change from X j to X j + /2 a reduced optimal expected loss by being passed over. Therefore the modified history
X n−2 stays within the set {τ * > n−2} . However, the RHS of the criterion (4.13) decreases by /2, so that now X n−1 = x * is unacceptable.
Case 2: Suppose now that (for a given history) there is no x * to yield equality of both sides of (4.13). Then the critical value must coincide with one of X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−2 .
Suppose it coincides with X k . For > 0 chosen as the distance to the nearest neighbor let X n−1 := x ∈ (X k , X k + /2). Then X n−1 lies to the right of the critical value and is therefore unacceptable. But now move X k into the interval (x, x + δ) with 0 < δ < /2.
This leaves the relative ranks of the new X k and all other X j 's with 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 2 unchanged whereas the relative rank of X n−1 drops by one. The LHS of the criterion is therefore reduced by 1 − 2δ , whereas the RHS decreases by δ . But since r n−1 (X k ) differs from n − (X 1 + X 2 , + · · · + X n−2 ) by less than one, there must exist a sufficiently small δ such that this move renders X n−1 = x acceptable.
However, as in case 1, for such a δ the observations
unacceptable. This means that the modified history stays also within the set {τ * > n− 2} , and that X k determines whether τ * = n − 1 , or, alternatively τ * = n .
Remark 4.3:
Note that in case 2 (when a jump of the LHS occurs in X k ) the influence of X k on the decision to accept or to refuse happens to be particularly strong, but that the inequalities in the criterion may be reversible by keeping X k and X n−1 fixed and only varying the other preceding observations. §5. Improving on Optimal Memoryless Rules.
In this section we shall describe a strategy which is superior to the optimal m 0 -rule and (still) tractable. The construction depends on the following property of m 0 -optimal thresholds p * n−1 (n) (see Section 2):
Proof: Suppose we have observed X 1 , . . . , X n−1 and are wondering whether to stop with X n−1 = x. The memoryless rule may not use any of the past information involving X 1 , . . . , X n−2 , except that we know X j > p j (n) for j = 1, . . . , n − 2. If we stop with X n−1 = x we expect to pay
( 5.1) i.e. τ h (n) denotes the earliest time k , at which a h(k )-prophet would stop. Finally, let
Theorem 5.2 For all sufficiently large n ,
Proof: We first note that τ h (n) ≤ n since h(n, n) ≤ n . Also, if we stop at stage k with τ h (n) = k , whereas τ (n) > k , then we act optimally since, according to (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5),
) for all n . Moreover, the preceding inequality becomes strict for n > 2 , because if there are at least two more observations to come, any strategy will miss the smallest of these with a positive probability.
It is therefore sufficient to show that for all sufficiently large n ,
Now let a n = p * n−1 (n), b n = (1 + a n )/2 and A n = {x k ∈ (a n , b n ), 1 ≤ k ≤ n} . Since a n < b n < 1 for all n ≥ 2 we have P (A n ) > 0 for all n ≥ 2 . Moreover, since on A n no X k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 is acceptable under the optimal m 0 -rule, we obtain P (τ (n) = n) ≥ P (A n ) > 0. Now
so that it suffices to show that P (τ h (n) ≤ n − 1|A n ) > 0 . Note that P (τ h (n) ≤ n − 1|A n ) ≥ P (τ h (n) ≤ n − 1|A n , r n−1 = 1)P (r n−1 = 1|A n ).
By Renyi's record value theorem (Renyi (1962) ) for i.i.d. r.v's we have P (r n−1 = 1|A n ) = 1/(n − 1) > 0 , so that it suffices again to show that P (τ h (n) ≤ n − 1|A n , r n−1 = 1) > 0, for all n sufficiently large. This latter term equals indeed one for almost all n , since
n−1 |A n , r n−1 = 1)
where we used X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X n−2 < b n on A n in the inequality. Using it again for X n−1 yields P (2X n−1 ≤ 1 + (n − 2)(1 − b n )) ≥ P (0 ≤ n − 1 − nb n ) = 1 for almost all n, because, by Lemma 5.1, b n → 3/4 as n → ∞, and this completes the proof.
Remark 5.3: Table 1a of Section 2 strongly suggests that p n−1 (n) increases for n = 2 up to n = 5 with value .5359 · · · and decreases thereafter, converging (as we know) to 1/2 , but the proof of this does not seem to be straightforward. One can easily verify that it would imply strict improvement of the rule σ * (n) for all n ≥ 3.
More important than this observation however is the fact (see e.g. all be approximately .6 , and finally let X 11 = 0.55 . Then all X k for 1 ≤ k ≤ 11 are unacceptable under the optimal m 0 -rule (see Table 1a ), but (5.10) and Lemma 3.2 show that σ * (12) = τ h (12) = 11 and stops with a 3-record only. Nevertheless,the expected loss by stopping at stage 11 equals 3.55, whereas stopping at stage 12 yields a much higher expected loss of 12− 0.12 − 0.13 − 0.55 − (X 3 + · · ·+ X 10 ) ≈ 6.4 , so that even for non-record values the difference can be quite large. Clearly it would go up, if we moved X 1 and/or X 2 to the right of 0.6.
We could also give examples to show that the improvement can become effective earlier than at stage n − 1. σ * (n) is so far the "uniformly" best strategy we know.
The half-prophet rule τ h (n) alone would not do well for larger n ; it succeeds more often than the optimal m 0 -rule to select the smallest or second smallest observation but allows for worse outliers than the optimal m 0 -rule. Lemma 3.2 shows the influence of the powers n − k , which let L (+) k grow only slowly as k increases.
